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Much Ado About Nothing? 
A Note on Investment and Wage Pressure in 
Weimar Germany, 1925-29 
Hans-Joachim Voth* 
Abstract: According to the Borchardt hypothesis, state ar-
bitration during Weimar's relatively stable years (1925-29) 
led to excessive wage pressure. As a direct consequence, 
profits were squeezed hard and investment fell, giving rise 
to a 'small-cake economy' which, in the end, had to fail. 
Borchardt's interpretation, hotly debated amongst German 
and Anglo-Saxon scholars for some time, is challenged in 
this paper. I first discuss the shifts in basic demographic 
variables during the early decades of the twentieth century. 
It will emerge that declining population growth rates are 
largely responsible for the changes in macro-economic va-
riables noted by Borchardt. Finally, this article demonstra-
tes why the indicator of wage pressure used in previous 
work is fundamentally flawed. 
Ever since Knut Borchardt challenged the conventional wisdom about the Wei-
mar Republic's economy in general - and the scope for action during the Great 
Depression in particular1 - economic historians have continued to debate his 
conclusions.2 The so-called Borchardt hypothesis has two elements that are 
* Address all communications to Hans-Joachim Voth, European University Institute, 
Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini 9,1-50016 San Domenico Di Fiesole, Italy. 
The author wishes to thank seminar audiences at St. Antony's College, Oxford and 
EUI, Florence, for valuable comments. Albert Carreras, Peter Hertner and Tony Ni-
cholls were kind enough to comment on earlier versions. The DAAD has once more 
provided generous financial assistance. All remaining errors and inconsistencies are 
my own. 
1 K. Borchardt, 'Zwangslagen und Handlungsspielräume in der großen Wirtschafts-
krise der frühen dreißiger Jahre', in: Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Wis-
senschaften 1979, pp. 85-132; reprinted in: Ibid., Wachstum, Krisen, Handlungs-
spielräume der Wirtschaftspolitik, Göttingen 1982, pp. 165-82. 
2 The most important contributions are: C.-L. Holtfrerich, 'Zu hohe Löhne in der 
Weimarer Republik? Bemerkungen zur Borchardt-These', Geschichte und Gesell-
schaft 10 (1984), pp. 122-41; H. James, 'Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the 
Weimar Republic', in: I. Kershaw (ed.), Weimar: Why Did German Democracy Fail?, 
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interrelated. Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between them: Firstly, 
Borchardt argued that wages during the 'golden years' of the Weimar Republic 
(1925-29) were so high that profits were squeezed and, consequently, invest-
ment had to fall markedly below the level that had prevailed before 1914.3 
Secondly, he contended that the Brüning government had virtually no alter-
native to the strictly deflationary course on which it embarked.4 This second 
side to the Borchardt hypothesis is a direct consequence of the first aspect: the 
depression had such severe consequences in Germany not because the Brüning 
government pursued a rigorous policy of 'balancing the budget' and deflation, 
but because a 'crisis before the crisis' beset Germany's first republic.5 In con-
trast to the established consensus, Borchardt held that Brüning's policies were 
not only inescapable, but also beneficial. Weimar's 'sick' 6 economy allegedly 
emerged healthier from the slump - no longer saddled with excessive wages, 
Germany's Nazi economic miracle could only take place because of the enligh-
tened policies carried out by the Brüning government. 
This article will proceed in two steps. The first section gives a short over-
view of the economic and demographic conditions prevailing during both the 
Empire and the Weimar Republic. It will emerge that the indicator of invest-
ment performance used in the debate so far is conceptually unconvincing; if the 
appropriate measure for the expansion of capital stock is analysed, no signifi-
cant difference between the investment behaviour during the Empire and the 
years 1925-29 exists. The second section then asks how this finding can be 
reconciled with the fact that previous scholars have - in their majority at least -
found evidence of wage increases outstripping productivity gains. I will argue 
that a clear distinction between wages as a cost for enterprise and wages as an 
indicator of living standards has often been conspicuous by its absence in the 
Borchardt debate. Once this problem is remedied, there is markedly less evi-
dence for wage pressure during Weimar's 'golden years'. Section III concludes. 
London 1990; J.v. Kruedener, 'Die Überforderung der Weimarer Republik als Sozial-
staat', Geschichte und Gesellschaft 11 (1985) pp. 358-76; A. Ritsehl, 'Zu hohe 
Löhne in der Weimarer Republik? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Holtfrerichs Berech-
nungen zur Lohnposition der Arbeiterschaft 1925-1932', Geschichte und Gesell-
schaft 16 (1990), pp. 375-402; T. Baiderton, The Origins and Course of the German 
Economic Crisis. November 1923 to May 1932, Berlin 1993; as well as D. Petzina, 
'Was There A Crisis Before the Crisis? The State of the German Economy in the 
1920s', in: J.v. Kruedener (ed.), Economic Crisis and Political Collapse. The Weimar 
Republic 1924-1933, New York/Oxford/München 1990, p. 1-19. 
3 Cf. Borchardt, Wachstum, p. 177 ff. 
4 K . Borchardt, 'Zur Frage der währungspolitischen Optionen Deutschlands in der 
Weltwirtschaftskrise', in: K. Borchardt und F. Holzheu (eds.), Theorie und Politik der 
internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Stuttgart 1980, pp. 165-182, reprinted in: K. 
Borchardt, Wachstum, pp. 206-224. 
5 K. Borchardt, 'Wirtschaftliche Ursachen des Scheiterns der Weimarer Republik', in: 
K.D. Erdmann und H. Schulze (eds.), Weimar, Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie. 
Eine Bilanz heute, Düsseldorf 1980, pp. 211-249, reprinted in: Borchardt, 
Wachstum, pp. 183-205. 
6 Borchardt, Wachstum, p. 182. 
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I. 
For all the critical intelligence that Borchardt's hypothesis has attracted, one 
type of study has not been carried out: a systematic comparison of the Empire's 
and Weimar's economy and the socio-demographic context in which they oper-
ated. Borchardt's value-judgement about the 'sickness' of the Weimar economy 
is based on the fact that he perceives a systematic difference between the years 
1925-29 on the one hand and the Kaiserreich as well as the Federal Republic 
since 45 on the other. He stresses three main points: 
1. even before the slump, unemployment rates were markedly higher than in 
any other period of German economic history7 (cf. figure 1) 
2. real wages, when compared with productivity, stood at unprecedented (and 
never repeated) levels 
3. investment as a share of GDP had fallen from 16% in 1910/13 to 10.5% in 
1925/29.8 
What, then, are the reasons offered by Borchardt for this remarkably sluggish 
performance of the German economy during this particular part of the interwar 
7 Borchardt could of course not foresee today's malaise of unemployment reaching 
almost Great Depression levels. 
8 Borchardt, Wachstum, p. 196. 
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years? According to him, the economic peculiarities of the interwar period need 
to be appreciated in their political context. Borchardt sees the first German 
republic as a state haunted by the spectre of communism and worker militancy 
in general. Fear of a possible repetition of the chaotic situation in 1919/23 led 
governments to interfere with the economic process. This influence made itself 
astutely felt in wage settlements: if unions and employers failed to reach an 
agreement, state arbitrators could impose new 'tariff wages' (Tariflöhne)9 uni-
lateraly. Since fear of unrest was much more on the minds of public officials 
than beneficial economic policy, wage increases were generally too high. Al-
ready after the stabilization of the mark, firms were faced with excessive costs 
for labour. Increases in productivity were insufficient to offset these extra costs. 
The consequence of these politically instigated adverse supply conditions 
was a sharp decline in profits. As both present profitability as well as expec-
tations of future returns on capital fell to low levels, investment spending was 
dramatically reduced. Borchardt focusses primarily on one possible mechanism 
through which lower profits could have influenced the expansion of capital 
stock. The inflation, he claims, had devastated the capital market to such a 
degree that firms, if they wanted to finance investment, had no alternative but 
to plough back profits.1 0 Balderston has recently pointed to a second possible 
link: rates of return were too low in comparison with entrepreneurs' expecta-
tions. Therefore, they staged an 'investment strike', which became particularly 
severe after 1927.1 1 
Numerous critics of Borchardt have pointed to problems with his argument. 
The details of these contributions cannot be recounted in full here, but com-
ments have largely focused on one particular aspect: the relationship between 
wages and productivity. Holtfrerich demonstrated that a substantial fraction of 
the divergence perceived by Borchardt was due to the fact that he compared 
annual productivity with hourly wages, an approach that would only have been 
feasible had the number of working hours in the year remained constant be-
tween 1913 and 1925. 1 2 Since the introduction of the eight hour working day 
led to a sharp fall in per capita labour input in the economy, this technique 
biased the results in his favour. Despite the fact that Ritschl has recently been 
able to point to some inconsistencies in the data underlying Holtfrerich's cal-
culations,1 3 the latter's contribution is remarkable for pointing to an alternative 
interpretation of the distributional shift that occurred in Weimar Germany. The 
9 Balderston suggested the use of this somewhat clumsy translation of the German 
term. Cf. T. Balderston, Origins, p. 47. 
10 K Borchardt and A. Ritschl, 'Could Brüning have done it? A Keynesian Model of 
Interwar Germany, 1925-32', European Economic Review 36 (1992). It should be 
noted that a mere 12.5 percent of all investment was financed out of profits. Cf. H. 
James, The German Slump. Politics and Economics 1924-1936, Oxford 1986, p.132. 
1 1 Balderston, Origins, p. 81. 
1 2 Holtfrerich, 'Zu hohe Löhne', pp. 122-141. 
1 3 Ritschl, 'Zu hohe Löhne', p. 378 ff. 
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inflation had virtually wiped out the entire German 'rentier' class; a whole 
group of citizens had to work for a living rather than leading a pleasant life on 
the basis of income from capital. Holtfrerich argues that the increase in the 
consumption share in national income - and, therefore, the decline in the in-
vestment share - were largely caused by these repercussions of the hyperin-
flation.14 The appropriate public policy measure would consequently have been 
to encourage workers' savings, possibly through some form of tax shelter.15 
It is unlikely that Holtfrerich's explanation can account fully for this large 
change in the allocation of national income. He himself emphasizes that a 
substantial part of the shift can also be interpreted as the result of new forms of 
the organization of labour - modern industry needed more clerks and super-
visory personnel. These Angestellte tended to receive higher pay than wor-
kers. 1 6 Further, Holtfrerich sees the high wage/income share as the result of 
only weak economic growth. With a quicker expansion of national income, 
capital would have received a higher rate of return. Consequently, the level of 
consumption in Weimar Germany is no longer the cause of economic misery, 
but rather a sign of it. Yet the policy prescriptions are fundamentally different: 
demand stimulus rather than wage-cutting and an emphasis on supply-side 
conditions would have been more appropriate.17 
Almost all contributions to the debate 1 8 accept Borchardt's basic assumption 
that Weimar was essentially a 'sick' economic system.1 9 The single most im-
portant piece of evidence is the decline in investment between the late Empire 
and the period 1925-29. Investment is the crucial factor determining future 
well-being - per capita output largely grows because of the increased capital 
stock which one generation inherits from the previous one. Borchardt cites 
Hoffmann's figures which suggest a decline from 16 to 10.5 percent of GDP -
a reduction by more than a third. Balderston has recently stressed that the time 
series used for calculating capital stock during the Kaiserreich and the Weimar 
Republic are quite different.20 Yet, if the nature of the error is constant over 
time, the rate of expansion of capital stock should be comparable between the 
two periods. Table 1 gives an impression of the decline in investment in Ger-
many, 1925-1929 relative to 1910/13. 
What may account for the dramatic development portrayed in table 1 ? Until 
recently, economic historians of the German interwar years have rarely ap-
preciated the importance of disaggregating economic variables such as 'invest-
14 Holtfrerich, 'Zu hohe Löhne', p. 139 f. 
1 5 Ibid., p. 140. 
1 6 Ibid., p. 137. 
17 Ibid., p. 135 f; C. Maier, 'Die Nicht-Determiniertheit ökonomischer Modelle. Über-
legungen zu Knut Borchardts These von der »kranken Wirtschaft« der Weimarer 
Republik', Geschichte und Gesellschaft 11 (1985), passim. 
18 Balderston (Origins, p. 81) is a notable exception. 
19 James, German Slump; Ritsehl, 'Zu hohe Löhne'; Holtfrerich, 'Zu hohe Löhne'. 
2 0 Balderston, Origins, footnote 85, p. 80. 
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merit'. This gap has now been partly filled by James and Balderston, who 
established the crucial importance of distinguishing between restocking, invest-
ment in capacity expansion, and productivity-enhancing capital outlays. 
James's comment that much of investment during the Weimar period was de-
voted to restocking2 1 points to a similarity between the Wirtschaftswunder of 
the 1950s and this part of the interwar period. Balderston finds 'that such fixed 
industrial investment as occurred in this period was designed not to extend 
capacity, other than in a few branches . . . , but rather to further the so-called 
»rationalization« of industry'. 2 2 Initially, one may be tempted to view this as 
support of the Holtfrerich hypothesis - capacity utilization was low, and con-
sequently, little investment to expand production facilities was undertaken. Yet, 
it could equally be argued that non-market clearing wages held down the total 
amount of demand in the economy (in the case of lower equilibrium wages, the 
reduced income per worker would have been more than offset by higher num-
bers in the workforce), and that 'rationalization investment' only came to dom-
inate because employers were naturally keen to substitute away from the re-
latively more expensive factor of production (labour). For any given amount of 
output, then, the capital/labour ratio may have risen - despite the investment 
share in the whole economy still being low. 
21 James, 'Economic Reasons', p. 34. 
22 Balderston, Origins, p. 373 f. 
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It is the argument of this article that neither of these explanations are entirely 
convincing, and that a neglected factor was largely responsible for the apparent 
decline in the proportion of national income that was invested. Development 
economists have noted for a long time that economies experiencing high rates 
of population growth have to reduce consumption and spend proportionally 
more on investment than nations with stagnant or even declining populations.2 3 
In order to keep the capital/labour ratio at least at its past level, investment has 
to increase in line with population growth.2 4 This is precisely the reason why 
many developing countries today, despite high rates of investment and growth 
in total GDP face considerable problems - the number of people rises faster 
than either national income or investment per capita. 
In a historical perspective, the rapid growth of populations in Europe during 
the nineteenth century had more beneficial effects than the 'population explo-
sion' in today's Third World. This was for a number of reasons: First, de-
mographic growth, even if spectacular by the standards of the time, was slow in 
comparison to todays less developed countries (LDCs). While LDC today eas-
ily have populations growing at 2 -3 percent per year, European nations seldom 
grew at more than 1.5 percent.25 Second, the European experience also differed 
fundamentally because levels of human and physical capital were markedly 
higher.2 6 Studies by developmental economists have demonstrated that mo-
derate population growth has beneficial effects.27 
How, then, do these findings from developmental economics relate to the 
Weimar economy? Demographic growth rates were remarkably high during the 
Kaiserreich - a source of national pride, in particular vis-a-vis the stagnating 
French. While the German population had grown at 1.366 percent between 
1900 and 1913, the rate of population growth fell to an unspectacular 0.64 
percent during Weimar's 'golden years' - 53.15 percent less. It is obvious that 
23 Cf. J. M. Keynes, 'Some Economic Consequences of a Declining Population', Eu-
genics Review 29 (1937/38); D. Bender, 'Entwicklungspolitik', in: D. Bender et al., 
Wahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik Bd. 2 (München 
1988), p. 501ff; G. Feichtinger, Art. Bevölkerung, in: W. Albers et al. (eds.), Hand-
wörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaften Bd. 1 (Stuttgart 1977), p. 623. 
24 One could of course object that during the 1920s, the large cohorts born before 1914 
were only just entering the labour market (Cf. James, 'Economic Reasons', p. 33f). 
Yet since fixed investment is almost always supposed to be used for a rather long 
time, entrepreneurs would have been more concerned about the sharply falling num-
ber of young adults that would enter the labour force within the next few years. 
25 After thirty years, a population growing at 1.5 percent would have increased by 56 
percent, whereas a population growing at 3 percent will increase by 143 percent. Cf. 
World Bank, Population Change and Economic Development, New York 1984, p. 39. 
26 In a context of increasing returns to scale, population growth will generate additional 
rewards. Some writers have related the poor performance of the French economy to 
an inabilitity to capture economies of scale. Cf. F. Caron, An Economic History of 
Modern France, London 1979, p. 199 f. 
27 D. Bloom and R. Freeman, 'Economic Development and the Timing and Components 
of Population Growth', NBER Working Paper 2448 (November 1987), p. 22-23. 
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an economy experiencing such a sharp slowdown of population growth will 
save - and invest - less in the aggregate. Factories need not expand at the same 
rate, fewer additional schools and roads, houses and ports are needed. How 
much, then, of the slowdown in capital formation can be explained by declining 
population growth? Table 2 assembles the necessary evidence: 
While population growth fell by 53.15 percent, the rate of capital formation 
declined by 28.8 percent. In order to calculate the 'rear rate of slowdown of 
capital formation, we have to adjust for the changing demographic structure. 
Column 3 gives the rate of expansion of capital stock per capita. Here, the 
Empire achieved 1.82 percent per annum, as opposed to 1.63 percent for the 
Weimar republic. Calculated in this way, investment during the period 1925-29 
was only 10.4 percent lower than during the Kaiserreich; 89.6 percent of the 
observed difference between the two periods is caused by the different de-
mographic regime. Figure 2 demonstrates the effect of using capital formation 
per capita, rather than the total value. Weimar looks very much less like an age 
of crisis once this fundamental variable has been taken into account. 
Economic indicators, like most variables measured by statistical bureaus or 
reconstructed by economic historians, are observed with an error. Is the mark-
edly smaller difference we find statistically significant, or is the remaining 
differential due to chance? Table 3 reports the results for both t-tests and 
Mann-Whitney U-tests. We use Hoffmann's time series for capital stock as well 
as his estimates of population growth. In column 1 and 2, the test variable was 
total capital formation, calculated as 
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In columns 3 and 4, the rate of growth of capital was corrected for population 
growth: 
(M-W U refers to the Mann-Whitney U-test, the result reported is the Z-score; data 
for capital stock came from Hoffmann, Wachstum, p. 253; data for population growth 
came from ibid., p. 173) 
I used a grouping variable to discriminate between the Empire and the Weimar 
period. It took the value of 1 during 1925-29, and 0 otherwise. Sample period 
was 1876-1929, with missing observations between 1914 and 1925. The 
Mann-Whitney U-test indicates a significant difference between both periods 
when the uncorrected rate of capital accumulation is used: with a Z of - 1 . 7 4 , 
we cannot reject the hypothesis of the two sample periods being different at the 
10 percent level (although the value is too small to be significant at the 5 
percent level). With the use of the corrected rate of capital formation, no sig-
nificant difference can be discerned - the probability of the two populations 
having the same mean is 82 percent. Although there are some doubts about the 
feasibility of using a parametric technique for this specific task, t-tests are also 
reported. Here, the same pattern can be observed. With the variable from equa-
tion (1), the test yields a t-statistic of 2.58 - significant at the 0.1 percent 
level . 2 8 This seemingly significant difference again emerges as caused by the 
fact that population growth rates have not been taken into account. For invest-
2 8 The t-statistic reported assumes equal variances. Levene's test for equality of varian-
ces indicates an 8 percent probability of the two periods having different variances. 
The corresponding t is 1.81, which is not significant even at the 10 percent level. 
133 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 19 — 1994 — No. 3, 124-139
ment per capita, the t-statistic is a mere 0.63 - equivalent to a 53 percent 
probability that Weimar did not differ from the Empire in this regard. 
II. 
The previous section has demonstrated that Weimar's investment record was 
not significantly different from the Empire's if we focus on the decisive varia-
ble that determines future well-being: the expansion of capital stock per head of 
population.29 However, what of the evidence that wage increases outstripped 
productivity gains during the second half of the 1920s? How could the pro-
ductive capacity per head of population grow at an unaltered speed if wage 
pressure was strong? 
There are two possible answers to this objection. The first is that, although 
capital formation per capita continued at an undiminished pace, total invest-
ment was lower, thus giving scope for increased consumption. Two economists 
writing on the consequences of slowing population growth in Europe today 
observed that 
the economy with a static labour force achieves higher sustainable consumption per 
head partly because, at a given capital intensity, the amount of capital widening 
investment necessary to maintain that capital intensity is lower, but primarily because 
it adopts more mechanised, capital-intensive techniques of production (having a high-
er capital-output ratio). 3 0 
This is in part what we observe during Weimar's 'golden years'. Further, the 
increased share of national income going to labour need not be a sign of state 
interference any more: slower population growth will lead to a tighter labour 
market, driving up wages. This is exactly what Balderston observed:31 partici-
pation rates were rising fast, and there is no reason to assume that the econo-
my's demand for labour could have been satisfied if wages had remained stag-
nant. 
This first explanation of the seeming paradox posed by section I may go 
some way towards resolving the conundrum.3 2 I would also like to argue that 
the degree of wage pressure in Germany, 1925-29, has been grossly overstated. 
To be sure, there is no shortage of calculations of the CRP - the cumulative real 
wage position of the German workers (kumulierte Reallohnposition). In his 
first articles, Borchardt had used this concept which was initially developed by 
the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft.33 The formula implicit in his original article is 
29 Borchardt himself stresses the crucial importance of investment for economic growth, 
yet fails to note that capital per head of population is the correct point of reference. 
Cf. Borchardt, Wachstum, p. 196. 
30 J. Ermisch and H. Joshi, 'Demographic Change, Economic Growth and Social Wel-
fare in Europe', CEPR Discussion Paper 179 (May 1987). 
31 Balderston, Origins, p. 80 f. 
32 For the obvious limitations, cf. footnote 24. 
134 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 19 — 1994 — No. 3, 124-139
(Y - output, L - labour input, w - wage, p - price) 
Wage increases will not push the CRP up as long as there are commensurate 
rises in productivity.3 4 Ritschl's recent contribution has corrected Holtfrerich's 
calculations because of new estimates of Y/L - Ritschl claims that the national 
accounts used by Holtfrerich seriously overstate per capita productivity. Table 4 
compares their calculations of KRP for the years 1925-29. 
It is one of the remarkable features of the entire debate that few attempts have 
been made to improve on the denominator in equation (3). Real wages can be 
defined in two different ways - either as the amount of goods and services that 
workers can purchase in return for their exertions, or as the cost incurred by 
employers. In the former case, we would want to deflate the nominal wage with 
an index of the cost of living. This is the approach that the majority of con-
tributors to the Borchardt debate has followed.35 However, this is - strictly 
3 3Borchardt, Wachstum, p. 178. 
34 Economists have increasingly critizised the concept as such: Cf. O. Landmann et al., 
'Unemployment and the Real Wage Gap: A Reappraisal of the German Experience', 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 129 (1993), p. 692 ff. 
3 5 The only exception is von Kruedener, 'Überforderung' p. 37Iff. 
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speaking - not the correct indicator to be applied if one wishes to discuss the 
question whether wage increases generated excessive pressure on entrepreneu-
rial profits.36 Ritschl in principle acknowledges this, yet claims that actual 
differences would be negligible.37 I will demonstrate that this claim is unfound-
ed, and that the actual divergence of wages and productivity is considerably 
smaller than has been suggested by earlier work. 
Von Kruedener used the price index of investment goods. This is consid-
erably closer to the price index we would ideally want to use - an index of 
output prices - than the cost-of-living index employed by the other protagonists 
in the debate. Since, however, the Institut fur Konjunkturforschung began to 
collect time series of prices for industrial products from the middle of the 
1920s, onwards 3 8 there is still considerable scope for improvement. Figure 3 
demonstrates the degree to which both indexes diverged. After the end of the 
hyperinflation, prices for industrial products stabilized at a comparatively high-
er level than consumer prices. Recall equation (3). With the expression in the 
denominator (W/P), relatively higher prices mean that the cumulative real wage 
position was lower than implied by Ritschl. Until 1927, there is a tendency 
towards convergence of the two price series. Between 1928 and 1930, indus-
trial products are again relatively more expensive than consumer goods. Only 
after 1931 is the situation reversed, with the consumer price index being higher 
(in relation to 1913) than the index for industrial output. Table 5 compares a 
calculation of the cumulative real wage position for German industry based on 
the IfK-index with Ritschl's results. 
The use of the IfK-index has considerable effect on the CRP-indicator of wage 
pressure during the Weimar period. After the stabilization of the Mark, the 
cumulative real wage position was not more than 15 percent higher than in 
1913, as claimed by Ritschl. Rather, the difference only amounted to little more 
than 4.5 percent - considering the inaccuracies of statistics at the time, this 
hardly constitutes a significant divergence.39 Only in the late 1920s are wages 
clearly forging ahead of productivity. The maximum divergence, however, 
amounted to 16.1 percent, and not the 19.5 percent claimed by Ritschl. 
36 This is precisely the conclusion reached by English economic historians during their 
debate on wages and unemployment in the 1920s and 1930s: M. Beenstock, P. War-
burton, 'Wages and Unemployment in Interwar Britain', Explorations in Economic 
History 23 (1986), pp. 162, 169f. 
37 'Ein theoretisch wesentlicher Punkt ist zudem, daß für den Produzenten die realen 
Lohnkosten gemessen werden sollten in Kaufkrafteinheiten seiner eigenen Erzeug-
nisse, weniger in Kaufkrafteinheiten der Löhne auf dem Markt für Konsumgüter.' 
Ritschl, 'Löhne', p. 385. In his recent econometric study, Ritschl correctly deflates 
profits with the index I will subsequently use. Cf. Ritschl, 'Goldene Jahre? Zu den 
Investitionen in der Weimarer Republik', Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwis-
senschaften 114(1994), p. 109. 
38 E. Wagemann (ed.), Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch 1936, Berlin 1935, p. 104, 
table 23. 
39 Holtfrerich ( 'Löhne', p. 131) makes similar allowances for errors in the statistics. 
136 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 19 — 1994 — No. 3, 124-139
Historical Social Research, Vol. 19 — 1994 — No. 3, 124-139
Table 6 repeats the exercise for the economy as a whole. The tendency of our 
results is similar to those reported above: The cumulative real wage position 
indicates virtually no cost pressure in 1925 - the index suggests a gap of 2.64 
percent between wages and productivity. After considerable increase, it reaches 
a peak that is still considerably below the values calculated by Ritschl. 
These new calculations of the cumulative real wage position thus give further 
support to Holtfrerich's claim that the 'available statistics do not show that 
wage increases in industry clearly broke the limits drawn by labour producti-
vity increases in the economy as a whole.' 4 0 
III. 
This paper has taken a fresh look at investment and wage pressure during the 
Weimar republic, 1925-29. In contrast to earlier interpretations that stressed the 
detrimental effects of excessive pay increases, I have suggested a different 
interpretation of the macroeconomic data. Once the fundamental importance of 
distinguishing between 'capital-widening' (extensions of capacity) and 'capi-
tal-deepening' (productivity-enhancing investment) is established, it emerges 
that Weimar Germany's investment record is not inferior to the Empire's. In-
vestment per capita was not significantly lower; the overall decline in the share 
40 C.-L. Holtfrerich, 'Economic Policy Options and the End of Weimar', in: I. Kershaw 
(ed.), Weimar, p. 75 f. 
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of G D P devoted to additions to capital stock can almost exclusively be ex-
plained by slowing population growth. In this sense, the seemingly poor per-
formance of the first republic was caused by the repercussions of the First 
World War. 
The second section demonstrated that Weimar also looks much less like an 
'unviable economic system' if we calculate the index of wage pressure on a 
basis that was relevant to employers, deflating wages by the index of industrial 
prices. Previous calculations of the cumulative real wage position have syste-
matically overestimated the divergence of wages and productivity since they 
used the cost-of-living index to this end. 
In combination, these findings suggest that the 'Borchardt controversy' fo-
cussed on a misleading indicator of macroeconomic performance - the share of 
G D P devoted to investment - which was then explained by a fundamentally 
flawed measure of wage pressure. Unless the findings presented in this paper 
can be substantially revised by future research, the debate over the weakness of 
the Weimar economy should be over. During the past decade, the Borchardt 
debate has generated important insights into the nature of the German interwar 
economy. Today - at least with respect to Weimar 's alleged fundamental weak-
ness, the decline in investment - we may safely draw a parallel to Ludwig 
Wittgenstein 's famous dictum: 4 1 'The question does not exist any more, and 
this in itself is the answer. ' 
41 'Freilich bleibt dann eben keine Frage mehr; und eben dies ist die Antwort'. L. 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (-Werkausgabe Bd. 1), Frankfurt 1988, 
Satz 6.53, p. 85. 
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